prebendalism
As a result of that kind of patron-client or identity politics, Nigeria has regularly been one of the lowest ranked nations for political transparency by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions Index.[4]
Other results include the corruption investigations into the activities of 31 out of 36 Nigerian governors,[5] the frequent comments in the Nigerian press about the problems of corruption (for example, Victor E. Dike's article in the Daily Champion of Lagos, "Nigeria: Governance and Nigeria's Ailing Economy"[6]) and the common defenses of prebendalism as necessary for justice and equality in government funding (for example Oliver O. Mbamara's editorial, "In Defense of Nigeria: Amidst the Feasting of Critics" at Africa Events.[7]
Prebendalism has also been used to describe the nature of state-derived rights over capital held by state officials in parts of India in the early 18th Century. Such rights were equally held to be of a patron-client nature and thus volatile. They were thus converted where possible into hereditary entitlements.
Neopatrimonialism is a term used for patrons using state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in say, small villages.
Neopatrimonialism may underlay or supplant the bureaucratic structure of the state in that only those with connections have the real power, not those who hold higher positions. Further criticisms include that it undermines political institutions and the rule of law, and is a corrupt (but not always illegal) practice. Neopatrimonialism also has its benefits, however. Neopatrimonalism can extend the reach of the state into the geographical and social peripheries of the country, provide short term stability, and facilitate communal integration.
Neo-patrimonialism, as defined by author Christopher Clapham of The Nature of the Third World State, is a "form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines." It is a system in which an office of power is used for personal uses and gains, as opposed to a strict division of the private and public spheres.
"Neopatrimonialism" as a distinct term is generally held to have originated with Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, in his 1973 book Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism[1], deriving it from Max Weber's term, 'patrimonialism', who used the latter term to describe a system of rule based on administrative and military personnel, who were responsible only to the ruler. Neo-Patrimonialism, which is a modern form of the traditional Patrimonial form of rule, is a mixed system. Here elements of patrimonial and rational-bureaucratic rule co-exist and are sometimes interwoven
Neopatrimonialism is a label often used to describe African states, sometimes as a way of explaining why they have "failed" to effect neoliberal market reforms.[2] This focus is controversial, with some complaining that the term is vague, and others that its use has failed to take into account the politics of non-African states. For example, in 1998 Thandika Mkandawire said,
Another problem is that "neo-patrimonial" states in and outside Africa have pursued a wide range of policies including some that are squarely developmental. In other words, other than indicating the style of governance, neo-patrimonialism does not tell us much about what policies a state will pursue and with what success. In the African case "neo-patrimonialism" has been used to explain import substitution, export orientation, parastatals, privatization, the informal sector development, etc. The result is that, in seeking to explain everything, it explains nothing except perhaps that capitalist relations in their idealized form are not pervasive in Africa.[3]
Others have argued that the concept is valid and needs refinement. For example, a paper in 2004 identified political difficulties in Bangladesh as having their origins in the neopatrimonial system that had evolved there
Article: Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends
Although patronage is prevalent in developed and lesser developed countries alike, clientalism may be more entrenched in Lebanon than in most other countries. In fact, there have been a number of theoretical works and a myriad of empirical analyses of patronage and clientalism in modern societies.(1) These studies explicitly voiced a number of important observations. First, clientalistic arrangements are not destined to disappear or even to remain on the margins of the society with the establishment of modern regimes. Rather than dying out, the patron-client relationship has been found to crystallize in a great variety of forms. Second, patronage and clientalism assume a certain logic of social exchange; that is, clientalistic arrangements are built around asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open ended transactions.(2) Third, patron-client relations either have long permeated the central core of the society or have become an `addendum' to the central institutional modes of organization, interaction and exchange.(3)
In this article, I will argue that despite the establishment of modern Lebanon, clientalism has evolved and persisted along with other `modern' forms of participation. Its various forms have had a constraining effect on the enactment of universalistic policies and discouraged the development of citizen participation and support as contingent to general policy implementation. Accordingly, I first examine how clientalism is rooted in and intertwined with the Lebanese political system. I also discuss the coexistence of various forms of clientalism, by focusing on the transformation of patron-client relations from traditional forms of patronage to clientelistic brokerage typical of contemporary Lebanon. Finally, I will shed some light on the future trends of clientalism in Lebanon.
It has been argued that clientalism is a holdover from traditional or premodern societies. The dyadic, hierarchical, personalistic nature of clientalistic relations has been associated with ritual kinship, Sufism and feudalism, all of which enact forms of social interaction and commitments with roots in premodern times.(4) The pervasiveness of clientalism in Lebanon, however, is easily traced to the feudal eighteenth century when the overlord allowed peasants and their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. To a large measure, clientalism is also rooted in sectarian or confessional identity where, as of the mid-nineteenth century, the overlord extended his clientalistic network to include beside personal, sectarian allegiances as well.
The socio-economic and political organization of Mount Lebanon during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be characterized as feudal. In both its origin and evolution, the iqta' system of Mount Lebanon had much in common with other feudal societies.(5) The term iqta, however, denotes a socio-economic and political system composed of districts (muqata`as) in which political authority was distributed among autonomous feudal families (muqata`jis). The muqata'ji was subservient to the amir who, as a supreme leader, occupied an office vested in the family. In such case the Shihabs ranked first among great feudal families of Mount Lebanon, followed by the Abi al-Lama and the Arslans, all of whom were given the princely title of amir. Next in line came the families with the title of shaykh, including the Druze Junblats and Talhuqs and the Maronite Khazins. Almost equally important were the Shiite Hamadeh shaykhs, not to mention the Khuri and Karam shaykhs, both of whom were Maronites. Within the context of the Ottoman system of government, the Sultan was formally the highest authority over the rulers of Mount Lebanon and their subjects. The amir received his yearly investiture through one of the Sultan's representatives, the pasha of Saida, Tripoli or Damascus, under whose administration Lebanon and its dependencies were divided. Through the pashas, the amir also forwarded his annual tribute (al-miri) which he owed to the Ottoman treasury.(6) The amir, on the other hand, had the double task of dealing with the demands of the Ottoman pashas and acting as arbitrator among the muqata`jis in the case of internal conflict. The specific duties of collecting taxes, maintaining peace and order and exercising judicial authority of first instance over all local, civil and criminal cases involving penalties short of death were all part of the traditional authority of the muqata`ji.(7)
The basic characteristic of the iqta' systems was that political legitimacy and allegiance depended more on personal loyalty than on coercive obedience to an impersonal authority. To put it differently, the amir did not need to resort to coercion to generate and sustain conformity to his authority. Instead he relied on the good will of his muqata`jis and the personal allegiance of their followers (atba' or 'uhdah). It is to be noted, however, that this form of political allegiance was not in the beginning sectarian or confessional but predominantly personal. The mutual moral obligations and feelings of inter-dependence inherent in such personal ties are aptly absorbed and documented by Iliya Harik.